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Try to picture an angry and bewildered client who bursts into
his counsel's office with this tale of woe. He is in the whole-
sale clothing business. He had, a few months back, an order
from a merchant in a South American republic. He was glad
to get it. It implied appreciation of his goods in distant places.
His customer's credit, upon investigation, was found to be ex-
cellent. The goods were shipped, in due course arrived at their
destination and then the trouble began.
The customer, before posting his order, had called at his
National Trade Mark Registry Bureau and, finding that the
manufacturer of the goods he was about to buy had not regis-
tered the trade mark under which they were sold, registered it
himself in his own name. He then sent his order, after which
he proceeded to the custom house, stating that a shipment
might be expected shortly which he had reason to believe would
bear his registered trade mark. He, therefore, desired to file
a copy of his certificate of registration, so if his suspicions
should turn out to be well founded, the spurious goods could be
seized and delivered to him as contraband. And this, in due
time, is exactly what happened.
This narrative was related with interruptions to relieve pent-
up emotion and to express picturesque and definite views of
the trade morals of South Americans and foreigners generally.
But nothing could be done. The South American merchant had
proceeded in strict accordance with the laws of his own country.
The result was that he got his shipment for nothing except what
it cost to effect the registration; also he got a trade mark, made
valuable by another's expenditure. The American manufacturer
got what was left. It consisted almost entirely of experience.
Reverse the situation; a citizen of the same South American
republic, let us say, has a trade mark which he uses in his own
country and elsewhere in South America. For some reason
his goods are not sold in the United States. Finally a time
comes when he thinks conditions are favorable to introduce them
here. He makes a shipment and is becoming established under
the same trade mark he is using on his goods generally. He has
applied for, and obtained without opposition, registration of his
trade mark under our National Trade Mark Act. He feels
secure in his rights and begins to expand, when suddenly his
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agent in New York is served with a writ issued at the suit of
an American citizen who asserts that the mark belongs to him
because of his use of it in this country prior to the time the
South American's goods were sold here.
An investigation discloses that the American had seen goods
bearing the mark on a trip to South America. Being attracted
by it, he appropriated and used it as his own and claimed com-
mon law rights in it on account of priority of use in the United
States, in all of which under our law he was perfectly correct,
and his rights were sustained by our coufts in the suit he had
brought against the importer of the South American's goods.,
And once the common law theory of trade mark protection is
understood, this result must follow as a matter of principle. A
trade mark at common law is protected because, by association
with certain goods it is accepted by the public as a guarantee of
definite commercial origin, and hence the use or deceptive imi-
tation of the mark by another misrepresents this commercial
origin and deceives purchasers into buying the goods of the in-
fringer as those of the producer, whose reputation the mark
symbolizes. But if there is no use of the mark upon goods in
the market, there is no identificatioi by means of it, and hence it
cannot indicate origin with anybody, and there can be no mis-
representation by its appropriation or imitation and, therefore,
no deception of purchasers. As Mr. Justice Strong has said :2
in all cases where rights to the exclusive use of a
trade-mark are invaded, it is invariably held that the essence of
the wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer
or vendor as those of another; and that it is only when this
false representation is directly or indirectly made that the party
who appeals to a court of equity can have relief. This is the
doctrine of all the authorities. Hence the trade-mark must
either by itself, or by association, point distinctively to the
origin or ownership of the article to which it is applied. The
reason of this is that unless it does, neither can he who first
adopted it be injured by any appropriation or imitation of it by
others, nor can the public be deceived."
And as the only use our courts consider relevant is use in the
United States, and as the American citizen first used the mark
here and the merchandise with which it became associated here
was his, necessarily it follows that, according to common law
principles, the trade mark was his. But imagine, if you can, the
frame of mind of the South American after his experience with
1 Richter v. Anchor Remedy Co., 52 Fed. 455 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1892);
Richter v. Reynolds, 59 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 3d, 1893); Kohler v. Beeshore,
59 Fed. 572 (C. C. A. 3d, 1893); Kathreiner v. Kneipp, 82 Fed. 321 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1897).
2 Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, at 322 (U. S. 1871).
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the common law system of trade mark protection, and his prob-
able opinion of it and of commercial morality in the United
States.
In both cases diplomacy tried its hand at arranging thingz%
but nothing came of it. The parties to the controversy were
fully convinced that all citizens of the country where the diffi-
culty arose are poisonous rascals. Multiply this situation a few
times and serious international friction develops. Legally, no.
body is a rascal. The trouble is that legal systems are not the
same. Each country is a separate unit-a watertight compart-
ment.3 Inside it, its own laws govern; outside it, they have
no effect. And the laws of each differ basically.
As a preliminary to the discussion of the international situa-
tion, there must constantly be borne in mind the fundamental
difference between the legal systems of Continental Europe and
South America, and the systems in force in the United States
and in English spealdng countries generally where the common
law prevails. On the continent of Europe and in countries where
the jurisprudence is based upon Roman law, substantially all
the law is written. A given controversy must find itself sup-
ported in a written code or there is no law applicable. The re.
-ult is a radical difference in the way that legal problems are
approached. The English and ourselves take up a legal question,
to use Dean Pound's phrase, practically and professionally. That
is, counsel and the court, in effect, sit around a table and among
themselves work out the problem, getting what light they can
from earlier adjudications of similar questions and the funda-
mental equities. The Continental lawyer approaches the ques.
tion academically, by the technique of applying written texts.
The answer, he says, lies in such and such a section of the
zode or there is not any answer. The result is that the Con-
-;nental law lends itself to subtlety and refinement. In shor,
to express difference by analogy, the common law and the Con-
tinental law differ just about as religion differs from theology.
This basic difference must be borne in mind in order that the
two different trade mark systems which are in existence-the
common law theory and the statutory-may be understood.
3 Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U. S. 689, 43 Sup. CL 244 (1923); In re
Berna Commercial Motors, Ltd. [1915] 1 Ch. 414; Baglin v. Cusenier C.,
221 U. S. 580, 31 Sup. Ct. 669 (1911); Rey v. Lecouturier [190S] 2 Ch,
715, aff'd [1910] A. C. 262. In the United States the territorial subdi.
vision of trade mark rights has extended so far as to recognize concurrent
ownership of the same mark by different traders in different states. Gen-
eral Baking Co. v. Gorman, 3 Fed. (2d) 891 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925); United
Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90, 39 Sup. CL 48 (1918); Hanove2
Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 240 U. S. 403, 36 Sup. Ct. 357
(1916), particularly Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion at 424, 426, 36 Sup. Ct
at 364, 365; Narragansett Dairy Co. v. Anunon & Person, 262 Fed. 8S0,
881 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919).
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Under the common law, the right to a trade mark depends
upon use. Trade marks at common law are symbols of good
will. A trader uses a certain mark upon his goods. By this
association the mark comes to be relied upon by the public as
identifying that trader's goods. For another to use or imitate
this mark is to misrepresent his goods as those of the original
trader whose good will and reputation it represents, and this is
a fraud which a court of equity will enjoin.
Under the Continental system, use is nothing, public associa-
tion is nothing. Record a mark in a book in a public office and
ipso facto it becomes the property of the person who first records
it.
There are two theories of statutory trade mark protection re-
sulting from the two legal systems. The one which has pre-
vailed in this country is that the common law creates the right,
and registration is only evidence of it. Trade mark statutes
in the United States are, therefore, essentially practice acts.
The other theory upon which the statutes of substantially all,
if not all, Latin-American countries is based, is that registra-
tion creates the right. In these countries, unless and until a
mark is registered, it is available for anybody's appropriation,
and, conversely, when it is registered, it becomes incontestably
the property of the registrant, for the title based on registration
cannot be disputed. This theory of trade mark protection has
the advantage of certainty and precision. There is no doubt
of its efficiency to protect trade marks. It has, however, come
in for a good deal of criticism. It is said that it lends itself
to piracy and that it is generally unfair and unjust. But it is
logical, if the premise on which it is founded be admitted, and
that it protects trade marks is indisputable. That it sometimes
protects the wrong person, according to our notions, is not a
valid objection, because the right person could equally be pro-
tected if he took the pains to acquaint himself with the foreign
law and availed himself of it.
No comprehensive national statute of this sort is possible in
the United States on account of constitutional limitations on the
power of Congress, the common law being the basis of trade
mark right, and interstate commerce the limit of national au-
thority over the subject.
Since in this country, use and public identification resulting
from it, create the right, it follows that here statutory registra-
tion is merely confirmatory by affording a public record of claims
of ownership based upon use. The federal trade mark statutes.
create nothing; they do not confer any title upon the registrant;
they do not deprive anyone not registered of any title; they
merely create a presumption of ownership and afford procedural
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and jurisdictional advantages-that is, the plaintiff whose mark
is registered may resort to the federal courts for relief against
infringement and, in proving his case, merely offers his cer-
tificate of registration in evidence, raising the presumptinn, un-
less rebutted, that the plaintiff is the owner at common law of
the trade mark and that it is prhaa facie a good one. This is
the logical result of the common law theory of trade marlhs, just
as the incontestable right created by registration is the logical
result of the civil law theory, and it is this difference in legal
concepts that creates the trouble in foreign countries for Ameri-
can trade mark owners. Little difficulty may be expected in
Great Britain, in Canada, in Australia and New Zealand, and in
British colonies generally, where the common law prevails for
there the system approximates ours, but in the countries of
Continental Europe, in South and Central America, American
trade mark owners seem always to be in hot water due, ap-
parently, to the failure to appreciate the difference in the juris-
prudence which exists.
We who believe in the common law think that our system is
better than the Continental system. The Continental lawyer, on
the other hand, points out with a patronizing condescension that
the Roman law existed and functioned long before the naked
savages, who were our ancestors, left off staining themselves
blue; that theirs is a better and an older culture, and their sys-
tem a more refined and exact one, and implies that any other is
barbarous and fit only for the imperfectly civilized.
For many years sincere attempts have been made to help
matters by international convention. We are parties to several,
and the effect of them has been good as far as they have gone,
or could go,4 but, while much was expected of them,5 they have
4 The Paris Convention of 1883 (revised at Brussels in 1900 and at
Washington in 1911) was again revised at the Hague November 6, 1925.
Article 6 Bis. appeared in the revision of 1925 for the first time and con-
tains an implied recognition of rights in trade marks resulting from use
and association. It is as follows:
"The contracting countries undertake to refuse or invalidate, either ad-
ministratively if their legislation so permits, or at the request of an in-
terested party, the registration of a trade mark which constitutes a repro-
duction or imitation liable to create confusion with a trade rark con-
sidered by the competent authority of the country of registration to be
well known there as being already a mark of a national or another con-
tracting country and'used for products of the same or a similar hind.
"A period of at least three years must be granted in order to claim the
cancellation of these marks. The period shall start from the date of
registration of the mark. No period shall be established to claim the
cancellation of fraudulently registered marks."
5 For example, LuclEN BRTN, TADE AND COI MMERCI MAms (Paris,
1897) § 321 says:
"Commerce is essentially international; of all modes of activity of the
human intelligence, it is evidently the one which spreads farthezt abroad,
and extends to the greatest number of countries. In it, perhaps more than
in anything else, honesty is fundamental and indispensable. It is, then,
important that a manufacturer's trade mark, which is, so to spcak, his
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not reached the root of the trouble-the variant views of the
manner of acquiring trade mark ownership. No relief seems
possible until a serious effort is made to unify, as far as prac-
ticable, the domestic legislation of commercial countries. It
would be as hopeless to ask a government where the civil law
prevails to abandon it and adopt the common law as it would be
for a civil law country to ask us to scrap our system and take
theirs. But there seems to be no insuperable obstacle to having
the two systems, or necessary modifications of them, go along
side by side.
Take, first, the common law as applied to trade marks. A
merchant adopts and uses a mark with the result that, by as-
sociation, his goods become known by it. He seeks to register
it in the Patent Office when his business becomes interstate or
foreign. The Patent Office makes a search to find out if there is
any adverse use or other objection to its registration and, if
nothing is found, the mark is published for thirty days to afford
an opportunity to anyone, who would be damaged by its regis-
tration, to oppose. If no opposition develops, the mark is regis-
tered and a certificate is issued which creates a presumption of
ownership in the registrant. A certified and legalized copy of
this certificate can be filed in foreign countries as the basis of
registration there. These proceedings naturally take time, al-
ways months, and if there are contests, sometimes years.
signature, and is both the evidence and the assurance of his reputation,
since it acquires a real value only through that reputation, and assures
the consumer that the goods which he purchases deserve that reputation;
it is, I say, important that his mark be fully protected, and to be fully
protected, it should be so universally, both as to time and as to space. Uni-
versal protection of marks, or, more generally, of industrial property, is
the present tendency, and we see in this fact one of the greatest forward
steps of modern industry and commerce.
"But, to obtain this ideal protection, which must be universal and
everywhere equal-that is, uniform in all nations, for that is the ultimate
aim-there is but one means, which is, international conventions assuring
equality and uniformity of protection throughout the different countries.
"It should here be observed, that a convention, duly published, in so far
as it regulates private relations between the subjects of the different
states, constitutes a special law. For the points which it covers, a special
law repeals and takes the place of a general law; that is, in this case, the
interior laws of each of the contracting countries. A convention is a con-
tract between two States, between two equals, and each of the contracting
parties should execute it in good faith. If, then, the law of one of the
States is in conflict with the convention, the convention should govern; it
alone should be followed and executed, and the contracting country should
recast its legislation, so as to bring it into accord with the convention. The
State is responsible for the faithful execution of its diplomatic treaty.
"Conventions relative to industrial property cannot be too much en-
couraged; and this is especially true of international Unions such as those
of Madrid and Paris, which are the only means of securing that uni-
formity of legislation and protection which is so necessary in this con-
nection.
"It must not, however, be forgotten that, besides the interest of the pro-
ducer, however important that may be, there is the interest of the con-
sumer; that is, of the great mass of the public. For this reason great
encouragement should be given to the repression of all false marks of
origin or quality of goods and of all false names and marks placed upon
goods of any kind."
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Now, take a country where the so-called deposit system pre-
vails. An applicant files his trade mark on a printed blank;
there is no examination; a certificate issues forthwith and is
immediately available for foreign filing. The citizen of a deposit
countrT has thus an enormous advantage, and can beat the trader
who lives in a non-deposit country from six months to years in
securing foreign protection.
At a meeting of the International Chamber of Commerce, held
in Brussels in June, 1925,6 this whole matter was seriously dis-
6This discussion, at a meeting held in Paris February 12 and 13, 1926,
was crystallized into a report and resolution as follows:
"UNIFICATION OF THE LAWS GOVERNINIG TRADE MAIIS.
"Many efforts have been made to arrive at the unification of laws gov-
erning trade marks. An international trade marl: law committee was
created in Germany in 1911, at the suggestion of Dr. Edwin Katz; the In-
ternational Conference of Economic Associations which met in Bruvzels on
April 15-19, 1912; the International Association for the Protection of
Industrial Property, all examined this question. Mecsrs. 0sterrieth, Worth-
meier, Kohler, Capitaine have written at length upon the subject. The
International Chamber of Commerce also examined this question at the
meeting of the Standing Committee on April 24-25, 1925, at which lcssrs.
Capitaine and Burrell presented reports which were communicated to mem-
bers of the Committee.
"I. Osterrieth said that at the root of all the difficulty was the antago-
nism existing between different systems of laws, that were or were not
mandatory. The system of previous examination was in conflict with
that of freedom of deposit. Was it practically possible to conciliate the
opposing points of view and to arrive at complete unification of laws gov-
erning trade marks? What method should be adopted? Should a standard
law be drafted, or would it be better to begin by taking up a certain num-
ber of questions of detail on which unification might be attainable?
"I. Alaillard insisted on the importance of a definition of 'trade marh';
he thought that agreement would only become possible when agreement
had been reached on the definition of terms.
"Mr. Burrell thought that this was a fundamental qucstion. He e::plains:d
the operation in Great Britain of the two Registers which were now kept
under the Trade Marks Act. The proposal which he had made in his
Memorandum suggested the institution in all countries of two Registero, a
Register A in which marks would be registered after preliminary examina-
tion, which would give a right of property in the trade marks and real
trade mark protection, and a Register B in which marks would be regis-
tered without preliminary examination, with simply a declaratory effect
and merely assuring protection in case of unfair competition.
"In order to minimize the present opposition between the systems of at-
tributive and "declaratory registration, Mr. Burrell suggested that countries
having a system of preliminary examination should be asked to introduce in
addition a second Register containing marks deposited without preliminary
examination. In the same way countries which at present had a mere
system of deposit should be asked to introduce a second Register where
marks would be registered after e-xandnation. There would be no obliga-
tion on trade mark applicants to apply for registration after examination
and they would be entitled, if they so desired, merely to deposit their marks,
applications for registration after examination being merely facultative.
As the consideration of this question could not be undertaken without tho-
rough examination, Mr. Burrell proposed that a special Committee should
be appointed for the purpose.
"The following resolution was unanimously adopted:
"The Committee decides to relegate the question of the unification of the
laws of trade marks to a special commission composed of Messrs. Andre,
Burrell, Maillard, Osterrieth and Snijder van Wassenkirke, together with
additional corresponding members, in particular Mr. Rogers of the United
States, Mr. Trepka of Poland, AI. Lachout of Czechoslovakia. It invites
the special commission to study also questions relating to special hinds of
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cussed by the representatives of the forty countries who were
present. A bill prepared by a committee of the American Bar
Association seemed to show a way out of the difficulty., Briefly,
marks, such as defensive marks and provisional trade marks etc., together
with the question of the duration of protection, etc. The sub-committeo is
requested to present its report to the Secretary General of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce before July 1st."
7 See also English Trade Marks Act (1919) 9 & 10 Geo. V c. 79; United
States Trade Mark Act, 33 Stat. 724 (1905) and amendments collected in
U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 9485 et seq; 41 Stat. 533, (1920) U. S. Comp.
Stat. (Supp. 1923) § 9516a. "The Vestal Bill," H. R. 6248 now before
Congress, contains the following provisions:
"Proceedings to Obtain Registration.
"Section 1. That the owner of a Trade Mark in use in commerce within
the control of Congress may register such trade mark-
A. By filing in the Patent Office-
(a) A written application addressed to the Commissioner, signed and
verified by the applicant, before any officer mentioned in section 15 (b),
stating the applicant's name, citizenship, domicile, residence and busineis
address, upon what goods the trade mark is used, the duration of such
use, how the right was acquired and, if by succession or assignment, from
whom, and upon information and belief that the applicant is entitled to
the exclusive use of the trade mark in the United States, and that the
applicant is using it in commerce. A description of the trade mark may
be included if desired by the applicant or required by the commissioner;
(b) A drawing of the trade mark;
(c) Such number of specimens or facsimiles of the trade mark as
actually used as may be required by the commissioner;
B. By paying into the Patent Office the sum of $10; and
C. By complying with such rules or regulations not inconsistent with
laws as may be prescribed by the commissioner.
"Section 2. No mark by which the goods to which it is applied by the
applicant may be distinguished as to source or origin shall be refused
registration as a trade mark on account of its nature unless it-
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral or scandalous matter.
(b) Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia
of the United States, or of any State or municipality, or of any foreign
nation, or any simulation thereof.
(c) Consists of or comprises the portrait or signature of a living indi-
vidual unless by his written consent, or the portrait or signature of any
deceased President of the United States during the life of his widow, if
any, unless by her written consent.
(d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a trade mark
previously used by another as to be likely, when applied to the goods of
the applicant, to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as
to their source or origin.
When such previously used trade mark is applied to merchandise of the
same descriptive properties it shall constitute prima facie grounds for
refusing registration.
(e) Consists of a mark which when applied to the goods of the appli-
cant has merely a descriptive or geographical meaning or is merely a sur-
name.
Rejection on any of the foregoing grounds shall be subject to rebuttal by
evidence of relevant facts.
(f) Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d)
of this section, nothing herein shall prevent the registration of any mark
used as a trade mark by the applicant in commerce, which, in accordance
with the principles of common law, has acquired a secondary meaning dis-
tinguishing the applicant's goods. Substantially exclusive use as a trade
mark for five years preceding application shall be prima facie evidence of
secondary meaning.
(g) Registrations of a mark except under paragraph (f) of this section
shall be prima facie evidence of ownership as of the date the application
was filed. Registration of a mark by virtue of paragraph (f) shall be
prima facie evidence of the right as of the date the application was filed
to prevent others from using the mark in a manner likely to cause con-
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it is proposed to have two trade mark registers, one (which
may be called the "A" register) where marks may be entered
after the examination usual in countries where the examination
system prevails, and a certificate issued carrying a presumption
of ownership s in the registrant; and, in addition, to provide an-
fusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source or origin of
-the goods.
"Section 3. In addition to the registration provided in sections 1 and 2 of
this Act, the commissioner shall keep a register of-
(a) All marks communicated to him by the international bureaus pro-
vided for by the convention for the protection of trade marks and commer-
cial names, made and signed in the city of Buenos Aires, in the Argentine
Republic, August 20, 1910, in connection with which the fee of ,50 gold
for the international registration established by article 2 of that conven-
tion has been paid, which communication and register shall show a fac-
simile of the mark; the name and residence of the registrant; the number,
date and place of the first registration of the mark in the country in which
the owner has his main place of business or where he manufactures the
product on which the mark is used, including the date on which applica-
tion for such registration was filed and the term of such registration; a list
of goods to which the mark is applied as shown by such registration and
such other data as may be required by the commissioner concerning the
mark:
Owners of marks so registered, being domiciled in any country which is
a party to said convention, shall enjoy, while the registration remains in
force, all the rights and benefits conferred by said convention.
(b) In addition to the registrations hereinbefore provided for, the Com-
missioner shall keep a register of marks as a continuation of the register
of marks heretofore registered under paragraph (b) of Section 1 of the
Act of March 19, 1920, entitled 'An Act to give effect to certain provisions
of the Convention for the Protection of Trade Marks and Commercial
Names, made and signed in the city of Buenos Aires, in the Argentine
Republic, August 20, 1910, and for other purposes.' Wnenever any perzon
engaged in manufacturing in, or exporting from, the United States, shall
apply for registration of any mark (including therein a trade mar:, sym-
bol, label, package, configuration of goods, name, word, or phrase) other
than those expressly exciuded by paragraphs (a), (b), (e) and (d) of
Section 2, used upon goods manufactured by or for such applicant and
exported, or about to be exported, to any foreign country, accompanied by
a verified showing that no other person has any superior right to the use
of -such mark for like goods, and shall pay into the Patent Office the sum
of ten dollars, the Commissioner, subject to examination and search to
determine whether the mark is excluded by paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and
(d) of section 2, shall forthwith register said mark in said register and
issue a certificate of registration for such mark, which shall be evidence
of the date of filing the application therefor, and the claim of the regiz-
trant of right in such mark. Registration under this section, including
marks heretofore registered under paragraph (b) of Section 1 of said Act
of March 19, 1920, shall give the registrant the same protection in com-
merce of the marks so registered as the common law affords. Applica-
tions under this section shall not be published for opposition as provided
in Section 7, and shall not be subject to opposition as provided in Section
13, but the registrations shall be subject to cancellation under section 13,
paragraph (b), or Section 14, paragraph (g). Such registrations shall
not be used to stop importations under Section 29.'
s It would be conducive to the security of trade mark rights, if mar1s
which have been upon the register for a certain time should be incontest-
able. There is such a provision in the British Trade Marks Act of 1905,
where a mark registered for seven years is to be taken as valid in all
respects. 5 Edw. VII, c. 15, § 41.
I have long entertained the view that, when limited to the commerce over
-which Congress has jurisdiction and in the regulation of which its power
is complete, such a provision in a national act in this country would be
constitutional. There has apparently been created, under the treaty maldng
power, a class of trade marks the right to which is not dependent upon
use, and why, as an instrumentality in the regulation of interstate and
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other, or "B" register, where marks may be registered without
delay, the certificate carrying no presumption (without prejudice,
of course, at any time, to a transfer from the "B" to the "A"
register, after complying with its terms) marks upon the "B"
register, in common law countries, to be entitled to the protec-
tion which the common law affords and generally against unfair
competition, which is a wrong recognized in substantially all
civilized nations. If this plan could be generally adopted, many
of the present difficulties would be overcome, and its adoption
involves nothing radical.
No country is asked to abandon the system which it now has,
but merely to supplement it. The countries which register after
an examination will continue to do so merely adding a deposit
provision to be used by th6se who need or prefer it and vice
versa. Those who wish to retain the established system still will
have it, and those who like the other better may use it. No one
will be inconvenienced. Each can have exactly what he prefers
to use or not as he chooses, or as the circumstances warrant.
Quick, simple and inexpensive registration in the "B" register
will be of great benefit to American exporters in permitting
them, in foreign countries, to forestall possible piracy and by
placing them on; an equality with citizens of countries where
the deposit system prevails. The "A" register will benefit citi-
zens of those countries who now complain that their trade marks
are not respected because the deposit system and attributive
registration are in ill repute.
Of course any discussion of the international situation must
assume that owners of trade marks know, or will take pains to
find out, what their own, as well as foreign, laws are, and have
enough intelligent self-interest to avail themselves of the pro-
tection they afford. Otherwise it is time wasted to attempt
any improvement.
foreign commerce, Congress should be unable to create a legal presump-
tion of trade mark ownership, incapable of rebuttal. I am unable to per-
ceive. It is only fair, however, to say that the majority of my profes-
sional colleagues utterly disagree with me in this.
